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ABSTRACT 
Why are there more super-rich people in some countries than in others? Extra-
ordinary wealth is often regarded with envy and might raise the suspicion that it can 
only be accumulated with the help of a minimalist state that does not concern itself 
with the plight of the many. This raises the issue whether a high number of 
billionaires can co-exist with a high-taxing, interventionist, social and welfare 
spending government? These two questions are at the heart of this paper’s analysis. 
To answer them we undertake a quantitative analysis of the global Forbes list of 
billionaires. 
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Introduction 
What determines the accumulation of super-riches around the world? Table 1 
provides an overview of the number of citizens from each country with an estimated 
wealth of over one billion US$ as listed in Forbes (2001, 2002, 2003) as a rounded 
average over the period 2001 to 2003. Clearly the big and rich countries dominate the 
top of the list. The most striking result is perhaps the exceptional number of 
billionaires in the US, which has far more super-rich people than any other country in 
the world. On the other hand, there are billionaires in many countries, including 
developing ones. 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
Perhaps surprisingly, very little research has been undertaken to explain the 
variation in the incidence of extra-ordinary wealth. Indeed, this seems to be the first 
study looking at the issue from a global perspective. What does exist are single 
country studies analyzing in which sectors great fortunes were made and whether 
these sectors are characterized by restrictions to competition – see Siegfried and 
Roberts (1991) for the UK, Blitz and Siegfried (1992) for the US, Siegfried and 
Round (1994) for Australia, Hazledine and Siegfried (1997) for New Zealand. In all 
of these studies the economic sector was identified in which the fortunes were 
originally generated. Economist and economic historian experts were then asked to 
evaluate the degree of competitiveness in each sector. All country studies found that 
the fortunes were made in a great variety of sectors. Also, around two thirds of 
fortunes were made, contrary to what one might have expected, in sectors, which 
were judged as competitive by the experts. 
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Research design 
Our dependent variable is the number of billionaires in each country. To even out 
unusual anomalies of a specific year we use the rounded average over the period 
2001 to 2003 as listed in Forbes (2001, 2002, 2003). The lists usually count a fortune 
held by various members of one family as one entry, which is appropriate for our 
purposes here as the fortune is likely to stem from the same source. The ownership of 
publicly traded companies is valued at share market prices. For privately held 
companies estimates of revenues and prevailing share price to revenue ratios for 
similar publicly-traded companies were used to estimate their value (Forbes, 17 
March 2003: 140). Where available the estimated value of art collections, real estate 
etc. is also included. 
Our first hypothesis is that a high incidence of extra-ordinary wealth is 
associated with the very core of economic freedom, namely the freedom to own 
property and to make use of it for one’s own economic benefit. This is because 
human beings are characterized by great differences in entrepreneurial skill, 
intelligence, perseverance, leadership and other economically relevant human 
qualities. In countries where individuals are allowed to pursue their own economic 
interest these differences will invariably result in great and often extra-ordinary 
differences in economic wealth. We use the ‘protection of property rights’ sub-index 
of the US Heritage Foundation’s (2003) Index of Economic Freedom 
(PROPERTYRIGHTS), which measures the security and enforcement of private 
property on a one to five scale. Unfortunately, the Heritage Foundation data goes 
only back in time until 1995 and we use the average values between 1995 and 2001. 
Of course, contemporaneous great wealth has often been created many years or even 
decades back and then bequeathed to the current generation’s super rich. It is highly 
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likely that the extent of protection of property rights is strongly correlated over time. 
However, in the absence of actual historical data on the extent of private property 
protection, we use a further rather crude measure, namely the number of years a 
country’s economy has been under Communist rule (YEARS COMMUNIST). To 
create this variable we used the assessment and data provided by Kornai (1992, table 
1.1), extended by information taken from Keesing’s Record of World Events. 
Our second hypothesis is that even where the very core of economic freedom 
exists super fortunes cannot emerge if the economy is subject to a great extent of 
government intervention. High income and corporate taxes, high government 
expenditures, widespread government ownership of businesses and industries and 
large-scale government interference with wages and prices might prevent the 
creation of great wealth. We use a range of variables to measure “big” government. 
First, a measure of the fiscal burden a government imposes upon an economy 
(FISCALBURDEN), which assesses countries according to the level of the top 
income and corporate tax rates and the extent of government expenditures. Second, 
we use a measure of the extent of general government intervention into the economy 
(GOVINTERVENTION), which assesses government consumption and government 
ownership of businesses. Third comes a measure of wage and price controls 
(GOVCONTROL), which refers to the existence of minimum wage laws and 
government interference with the setting of prices. These three variables are also 
taken from Heritage Foundation (2003) and are all measured on a one to five scale. 
The fourth measure is taken from IMF (2002) and refers to the level of public social 
and other welfare expenditures relative to GDP (%SOCWELFARE). For all these 
variables the 1995 to 2001 average value was taken. 
 5 
Our third hypothesis is that a high degree of competition in national economies is 
not a hindrance to the creation of super fortunes. This is somewhat difficult to test. 
On a global scale, we have no direct measure of the degree of general competition 
within national economies. However, we use the absence of tariff protection and 
non-tariff barriers as our measure of the degree of competition national economies 
are exposed to (TRADEOPEN). This variable is also measured on a one to five scale 
and taken from Heritage Foundation (2003). The rationale is that competition within 
an economy is higher the less protection exists against competitors from foreign 
countries. 
A number of further control variables are included. The rationale for including 
population size is simply that more populous countries are likely to have more super 
riches than small countries (data from World Bank, 2003). The association with per 
capita income is not so clear-cut, but it might be easier to accumulate great wealth in 
an economy where people are generally wealthy, but of course much less wealthy 
than the super rich (data from Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002). In Weberian 
tradition, a Protestant culture might promote a work ethic that is conducive to the 
accumulation of wealth. Also, such a culture might view economic success not with 
suspicion, but as the just consequence of righteous behavior. The percentage of 
population that is Protestant (%PROTESTANT) is taken from Parker (2000). A US 
dummy variable is included to account for its special role. The OECD dummy 
captures any structural differences between developed and developing countries, 
which might exist. Both population size and per capita income enter the regressions 
in logged form to render their distributions less skewed.  
A model with the number of billionaires in each country as the dependent 
variable cannot simply be estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). This is 
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because the dependent variable is only partly continuous with positive probability 
mass at the value of zero. An appropriate estimator for such a model is the Tobit 
estimator. 
 
Results 
Column I of table 2 tests our hypotheses. Due to its lower availability, 
%SOCWELFARE is only added to the model in column II. The two regression 
results show very little difference even though the sample is smaller in column II. 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
The estimates clearly suggest evidence in favor of our first hypothesis. A greater 
guarantee of private property is positively associated, whereas a higher number of 
years under Socialist/Communist dictatorship is negatively associated with the 
incidence of great wealth. On the basis of our results we reject our second 
hypothesis, however. Neither a higher fiscal burden, nor a greater extent of 
government intervention, nor a greater extent of governmental interference with 
prices and wages has a negative effect on the incidence of great wealth. The same is 
true for higher social and other welfare expenditures. One might wonder whether this 
result is perhaps due to the correlation of these variables. However, entering them 
either separately or in combinations of one, two or three does not change the results. 
The TRADEOPEN variable coefficient is positive and statistically significant in 
column I and marginally insignificant in column II. Our estimation results therefore 
suggest that trade openness is conducive to the accumulation of great wealth or at 
least not detrimental to it. In as much as trade openness captures the degree of 
competition prevailing in national economies, this result suggests that a high degree 
of competition does not represent a barrier to the accumulation of great fortunes. 
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As concerns our further control variables, we find the expected positive impact 
of population size and per capita income. The US dummy is highly statistically 
significant, confirming the special position of this country that even a cursory glance 
at table 1 would already reveal (deleting the US from the sample leads to very similar 
results for the other variables). Interestingly, however, the OECD dummy is highly 
insignificant, suggesting that there is no fundamental difference between developed 
and developing countries, of course conditional on our other explanatory variables. 
The accumulation of great fortunes is not facilitated by a Protestant work ethic and 
culture as measured by %PROTESTANT. 
 
Conclusion 
The accumulation of great fortunes creates uneasiness, envy and concern in many 
people. Whatever might speak against such fortunes, our results demonstrate that 
their existence is not incompatible with an interventionist government spending a 
great deal of the national income on social and other welfare purposes. Great 
fortunes also do not seem to be dependent on a low degree of competition. The 
protection and enforcement or private property is key and it is easier to accumulate 
great wealth in richer than in poorer countries. 
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Table 1. Billionaires worldwide. 
United States 230 
Germany 32 
Japan 24 
Canada 14 
France 13 
Italy 13 
United Kingdom 12 
Switzerland 12 
Hong Kong 11 
Mexico 11 
Russia 10 
Saudi Arabia 7 
Spain 7 
Brazil 5 
India 5 
Sweden 5 
Turkey 5 
Malaysia 4 
Singapore 4 
Taiwan 4 
Australia 3 
Israel 3 
Netherlands 3 
Philippines 3 
Argentina 2 
Chile 2 
Denmark 2 
Greece 2 
Ireland 2 
South Africa 2 
South Korea 2 
Thailand 2 
Venezuela 2 
Belgium 1 
China 1 
Colombia 1 
Indonesia 1 
Kuwait 1 
Lebanon 1 
Liechtenstein 1 
Norway 1 
Portugal 1 
United Arab Emirates 1 
All other countries 0 
 
Source: Rounded average from Forbes (2001, 2002, 2003). 
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Table 2. Estimation results. 
 (1) (2) 
PROPERTYRIGHTS 2.451 2.744 
 (1.95)* (1.90)* 
YEARS COMMUNIST -0.096 -0.093 
 (1.99)** (1.76)* 
FISCALBURDEN 1.356 0.808 
 (1.33) (0.65) 
GOVINTERVENTION -1.235 -1.376 
 (1.18) (1.10) 
GOVCONTROL 0.979 0.694 
 (0.74) (0.47) 
%SOCWELFARE  -0.041 
  (0.56) 
TRADEOPEN 2.080 1.942 
 (1.90)* (1.51) 
ln GDP p.c. 6.166 6.076 
 (4.60)*** (3.60)*** 
ln POPULATION 5.821 5.893 
 (8.44)*** (7.77)*** 
US-DUMMY 203.912 204.169 
 (39.88)*** (37.56)*** 
OECD-DUMMY 0.598 1.401 
 (0.26) (0.53) 
%PROTESTANT -0.022 -0.027 
 (0.67) (0.75) 
Constant -135.353 -138.002 
 (7.29)*** (6.32)*** 
Pseudo R-squared .5049 .5002 
Observations 147 130 
 
Note: Dependent variable is # BILLIONAIRES. Tobit left-censored estimation. 
Absolute t-values in brackets. * significant at 90% ** at 95% *** at 99% level. 
